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I have a fascination with conspiracy theories as evidenced by my enjoyment of  
films like The Parallax View and TV series' like The X-Files and yet I seem quite 
happy at times to see some views as paranoid, usually those I disagree with.  I don't 
think I am alone in this and in such apparent contradiction I believe we can learn 
something about the ambivalent relationship Western culture has with both.  
Discussions about conspiracy theories and paranoia always seem, to me, to be 
dualistic but what I want to argue here is that they are flip-sides of the same coin.  
When someone takes up a position where they feel they know what is really going 
on in the world, drawing on conspiracy theories, they will be seen by some as 
paranoid.  Rather than develop an intentionalist view of this, however, I want to 
examine some of the effects of both taking on a conspiratorial position and of 
positioning the other (an individual, group, organisation, nation and so on) as 
paranoid.  In other words, what do we do by believing in conspiracy theories and 
what do we do when we call others paranoid?  
 
When "we" adopt conpriatorial theories we, of course, see ourselves as knowing 
what is really going on.  For their believers conspiracy theories help to simplify a 
bewilderingly complex world.  They enable us to connect apparently disparate 
events through a narrative that sees the intentions behind mundane happenings.  
They also personalize events so that we have a focus for our suspicion and 
conspiracy films, for example, often have a person or group who are the "hidden 
hand" behind events.  By subverting the taken-for-granted world they mobilise 
people into action against perceived threats.  We know to our cost that the rhetoric 
of war serves to unify disparate national groups against an external threat and this 
worked well during the Cold War, Desert Storm and the bombing of Yugoslavia.  
Conspiratorial rhetoric works in similar ways often directed towards groups within 
a country and so, at a time of rapid geo-political change we increasingly see such  
accounts mobilized around political and religious groups and also around notions 
of ethnic identity as in parts of Eastern Europe. 
 
On the one hand, conspiracy theories may fill believers with a sense of purpose and 
missionary zeal to convince others -- as the narrator tells us in the 1960s TV series 
The Invaders "now David Vincent knows that the invaders are here, that they have 
taken human form.  Somehow he must convince a disbelieving world that the 
nightmare has already begun".  Alternatively, they may encourage them to 
withdraw and regroup forces against expected attacks as in Waco.  Through such 
processes, conspiracy theories enable their believers to construct a valued identity 
for themselves and to see non-believers as dupes or allies of their enemy.  Some, 
like Hofstadter, see this position as primarily one adopted by minority political 
groups and there is some evidence to suggest that those who adopt a conspiratorial 
narrative are often from powerless groups.  Mirowsky & Ross (Mirowsky, J. & 
Ross, C. E., 1983,  'Paranoia and the structure of powerlessness', American 
Sociological Review, 48, 228-239) reported that social positions characterized by 
powerlessness and by the threat of victimization and exploitation tended to produce 
paranoia.  People in powerless positions are paranoid then, because it makes sense 
in a world where others really do have power over you. 
 
Yet this is to simplify matters for conspiratorial accounts are also mobilised by 
politically powerful groups.  Thus at the height of her government Margaret 
Thatcher, drawing implicitly on McCarthyite notions of Communist subversion, 
talked of British Trades Unions as the "enemy within".  This strategy of 
marginalisation worked well in helping her to take extreme measures against the 
unions culminating in her systematic breaking of the National Union of 
Mineworkers during the year-long coal strike of the early 1980s. 
 
These are some of the effects of conspiratorial accounts but this is only one side of 
the coin.  What are some of the effects of labelling others as paranoid?  In doing so, 
we simultaneously mark "them" as different and other from "us" and as abnormally 
and pathologically suspicious.  We simultaneously see them not as "knowing what 
is really going on" but as fringe weirdos and so marginalize them and remove 
legitimacy from their views.  Thus when Harold Wilson referred to a plot by the 
British Security Service (MI5) to destabilize his Labour administration in the mid 
1970s a Conservative Member of Parliament called him "positively paranoic" and 
urged him to see a psychiatrist.  Similarly, following her interview on British TV 
where she described plots against her by the British Royal family, Diana, the 
Princess of Wales, was said by a Conservative Minister to be "in the advanced 
stages of paranoia".  Positioning the other as paranoid not only undermines the 
legitimacy of that person or group's views but it also serves powerful functions for 
those doing the positioning.  In calling others paranoid we construct ourselves as 
rational, reasonable and plausible -- an identity clearly valued in Western culture. 
 
Conspiracies do, of course, happen and there are times when suspicion is seen as 
legitimate but in Western culture, paranoia serves as a touchstone of what counts as 
reasonable suspicion.  A recent opinion poll in the UK found that 24% of people 
had lied to others and 64% felt they had been lied to at least once during the 
previous day.  Yet to act in the world as if one is being lied to on this scale would 
be to invite accusations of paranoia.  We know deceit and surveillance occur but to 
comment on them is to be seen as paranoid.  A good example of some of these 
paranoid traps can be found in the work of intelligence and security agencies.  
Would you believe a small-time Welsh Nationalist who told you that he had been 
followed by thirty eight MI5 agents on one day in a small Welsh fishing village?  
The scale seems ludicrous and yet Security Service evidence in a trial in the UK in 
1993 reveals that this actually happened.  A serious discussion of this kind of 
surveillance would quickly take the form of conspiratorial discourse, a discourse 
that would then inevitably and ineluctably be read as paranoid.   
 
Scholars have described how the Tsarist secret police the Ochrana were so 
successful in infiltrating agent provocateurs into revolutionary fighting 
organizations plotting to overthrow the regime that, in a significant way the 
Russian revolution of 1917 was the product of the secret police.  Similarly the 
British Labour MP Tony Benn has reported that the penetration of the National 
Union of Students by the Special Branch (a political and security branch of the 
British police) was so complete that, during one strike in 1966 one of the NUS's 
committees consisted entirely of Special Branch.  For the intelligence communities 
and the organisations they inflitrate such narratives are entirely functional:  
intelligence agencies need credible threats to survive and threats of infiltration 
build group identity in the targets of those agencies.  Thus, in the United States, the 
conspiratorial accounts on both sides of the Waco siege and the Oklahoma 
bombing served to warrant action taken both by right-wing and minority religious 
groupings and by the Federal government.  Thus, following the reported ending of 
the Cold War we see Intelligence Agencies refocus their targetting from the USSR 
to terrorism, drugs and "rogue nations".  
 
Writers like Philp K. Dick made great use of notions of reality-loops where one 
"reality" was suddenly discovered to be just a surface reality with another reality 
underneath and this was used to great effect in the film Total Recall.  We can see 
what might be termed paranoia-loops created in attempts to address conspiratorial 
culture. Reactions to movements seen as conspiratorial and paranoid can be as 
overwhelming as the groups' rhetoric.  Moreover, such moves themselves can 
become characterised by a paranoid narrative.  Shaw has noted how religious cults' 
"paranoia about the outside world feeds on the outside world's paranoia about cults' 
paranoia which feeds on cults' paranoia" (Shaw, W., 1994, Spying in Guru land:  
Inside Britain's Cults, London, Fourth Estate).  A traditional response to such 
concern is to pathologise those seen as dangerous by calling them paranoid a 
strategy that Shaw reveals to be double-edged.   
 
At the same time, conspiracies and surveillance have so permeated Western culture 
that they are now seen as entertainment as we have seen in the success of The X-
Files.  We have moved from the time when the Big Brother of George Orwell's 
1984 has been transformed into a prime-time television show across the world 
where volunteers willingly submit themselves to round-the-clock surveillance and 
we willingly watch them being watched.  This permeation of a surveillance culture 
has led Tony Benn,  in a recent House of Commons debate on the UK Police Bill, 
to comment about electronic surveillance (or "bugging"):  "in the old days, those 
who talked about being bugged were described as paranoid; nowadays people say, 
'What's new?'  Both attitudes are wrong.  We should not be regarded as paranoid if 
we know it is happening, and it should not be regarded as normal because everyone 
does it". 
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